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3.
Punic of 1907
Little need be said about the events leading to the
financial disturbances during the year 1907. The period just
preceding the panic was one of prosperity, industry and commerce
were favored by good prices and extensive activity. The
country quickly recovered from the panic of 1903. Financial
and industrial activity was general throughout the entire world.
On the European continent, Germany's issue of her securities
in 1905 was 70£ larger than in 1904. The whole world seemed
to enter into an era of frenzied speculation. Then came the
Russo-rJapanese War with its burden calling for large loans
from Paris, London, and New York. It is safe to estimate the
requisition of Japan in foreign markets (luring 1904-1905
at about one billion dollars.
In 1905 the fixing of the discount rate of the Imperial
Bank of Germany at 5, 5—§, and 6 per cent * -the last named
figure being the highest ever reached-did not seem to retard
German speculation. (l)ln Egypt, Japan, and South America,
also, the "fever of enterprise" seemed to be in the air.
In 1905 a groupt of Stock Exchange operators and specu-
lators, wealthy capitalists and bankers, formed a pool in
railway stock amounting to tens of millions of dollars, and
the stock cf these companies was forced up as much as twenty
per cent. All this was carried on in the face of falling bank
reserves and rapidly rising money rates. That year the full
legal rate, plus a banker's commission, brought the actual rate
up to 7 per cent. This showed that general trade felt the
1. A. D. Noyes - FORTY YEARS OF AMERICAN FINANCE P 325
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strain. Stock speculation went on. Money was raised in London
on the collateral of speculative hondings, and great blocks
of stock *.rere shipped from New York to the English market.
Money rates also advanced in Europe.
On November 11, 1905, and again on December 9 of the
same year, tha reserves of the New York Associated Banks fell
below the twenty five per cent, ratic to deposits as stipulated
by the National Bank Act. In November, call money on T,7all
Street was quoted at twenty five per cent., and still suecula-
1
tion continued. Some of the leading men in financial circles
then began to predict panic unless the frenzied speculation
was brought to a halt.
All of these events not only had a dominant influence
on the financial markets, but also had their effect on the
social life of the people. Extravagant living, spectacular
in its extent, was- indulged. A few men on the inside became
millionaires over night. Others who already controlled large
funds becamepjjeport ionately more powerful. These men drew
into their hands many additional instruments of production and
transportation. New trusts were formed. Competition was forced
out by .huge combinations under the leadership of such financiers
as J. P. Morgan, E. H.Harriman, James Hill, and the Vanderbilt
family. Then occurred the Equitable Insurance Company scandal,
when a quarrel between the president, James 7. Alexander, and
the vice-president, James H. Hyde, made public the questionable
2. London Correspondence - New York Evening Post ,
Dec. 9. Financial Section, page 3. 1905
1. A. D. Noyes p 328

5dealings of the company. Followed an investigation by the
New York State Legislature, under the leadership of its counsel,
Charles E. Hughes. This need not be discussed here. Suffice
it to say that the findings were sensational, and had an
unfavorable influence on public opinion.
'.That night have happened under the second administration
of President McKinley, we of course can not tell; but his dedh
brought into the seat of power Theodore Roosevelt, who declared
for the policies of Mr. McKinley. He warned the public against
that-deal ings ..with corporations, and declared that the individual
and corporate increase in fortune was due to natural causes
in the business world. In advising against dealing with
corporations, he said: "To strike with ignorant violence at
the interests of one set of men almost inevitably endangers
the interests of all. The mechanism of modern business is so
delicate that extreme care must be taken not to interfere with
1
it in a spirit of rashness or ignorance."
Vie need but mention the dissolution of the Northern
Securities Company under the Sherman Anti-Trust Law, and the
prosecution of the Standard Oil Company, and the subsequent
fine of this company by the Circuit Court. During 1906 we
heard the warnings of the experienced critics, and we remember
how little attention was paid to them by the powerful capital-
ists who were engineering the American speculation of the day.
Nor did Europe seem to heed the warnings, for it was stated
en the highest banking authority that the United Spates could
1. Annual Message to Congress, December, 1901.
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borrow almost an unlimited amount from Europe. The statement
1
proved true. Serious estimation of the use of outside capital
at this time involved sums which bewilder the imagination.
It was asserted by financial authorities that credit up to
$500,00G,000 was obtained in Europe, while our interior banks
1
placed not less than $500,000,000 in New York City.
The Union Pacific Railway sold a great part of the share
it obtained in the Northern Securities liquidation of both
Northern Pacific and Great Northern stocks. Consequently
the company held, June aO, 1906, in cash and money on call,
§55,968,000 as against $7,545,000 twelve months before. This
mass of capital was used to purchase shares of New York
Central, Atchison, Topeka, an.. Santa Fe", and Baltimore and
Chio, all active. Of these securities some, apparently, were
procured from holdings of "inside financiers," others from
the open market. The Union Pacific then borrowed $75,000,000
mere on its notes, and used the proceeds similarly. Taken
all together, about $151,970,000 was invested in railroad
stocks by the Union Pacific, under the guidance of Mr. E. H.
Harriman. In August, 1906, the annual dividend on its common
stock was increased from 6 to c0 per cent., and extended spec-
ulation took place on the Stock Exchange. The value of the
stock as quoted on the exchange rose thirty-five points in two
weeks, and there was a general rise in other stocks.
1. Alexander Gilbert, Pres. New York Clearing House
speech toNY. Bankers Assn. Jan. 27,1907
c Annual Report, 1906. U. P. R. R.
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The strain now imposed on banking resources v/as heavy,
and before the month was over, not only the demand rate for
money on '.Tall Street, biLalso the discounts of merchants, com-
manded the highest rate o. tside of panic years, since 1867.
In the month of September, 1906, the New York banks reported
a deficit in reserves. Appeal was made to the United States
Treasury, and in response the Secretary of the Treasury Shaw
deposited government surplus funds in the banks on the promise
that such funds should and would be used for the importation
of gold. Securities were supported, and in September not less
than $36, 000, 000 in gold was engaged in Europe for export to
1
New York. Europe had not looked for this turn of events.
In October the reserves of the Bank of England fell to a ratio
of only 35-f per cent., the lowest since 1893, resulting in
a very weak condition for the fall season. By the middle of
the month the bank rate rose from four to five per cent., and
on the nineteenth of the month it touched six per cent., the
2
highest point, with one exception since 1873. The Bank of
England had warned the joint -stock institutions to call a halt
in their grants of credit to New York, and threatened an advance
to seven per cent, in the bank rate. American speculation was
checked, because fortunately for London, the warning was heeded
by the smaller institutions.
The rise on the Stock Exchange came to a sudden stop.
It began to look as if the speculators were in a trap. Ex-
haustion of credit resources began now to make itself felt in
1. A. D. Noye - p 357
2. New York Lvening Post Oct. 20, 1906

8other quarters than the stock market. The railway companies
had been laying plans for a huge extension and improvement of
their plants. One of the well-known railroad presidents had
publicly declared in order to avert "commercial paralysis,"
which "long continued would mean slow commercial death," that
the railways must raise not less than one thousand million
1
dollars of new capital per annum during the next five years.
But the railways suddenly found the money market shut
against their stocks and bonds. Unfortunately, some of the
companies had already committed themselves to costly undertaking
on the basis of borrowings from the open market, and they had
to meet this indebtedness. A similar situation caused the
panic of 1873 when Jay Cooke and Company and the Northern
Pacific Company were crushed under a huge mass of floating
3
debt. Also the large railway failures of 1893 can be laid to
a similar cause.
As their floating debt of 1906 approached maturity, the
railways made vigorous attempts to avert the impending crisis,
through the placing of one to two year notes, at interest
from five to seven per cent., to which was added a heavy
commission for the banker. This wassuccesful . During the
first few months of 1907 about ^299,000,000 was raised on this
temporary basis.
4
1. James J. Hill, Nov. 10, 1906. New York Financial
Chronicle .
2. Janes J. Hill, June 14, 1907. New York Tribune .
3. A. D. Noyes - p 359.
4. A. D. Noyes - p 360.
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In March of that year, and again in August, there occurred
on the Stock Exchange sales so enormous and at such sacrifices
in values, as to convince the men of V/all Street that forced
liquidation was being carried on by the larger financiers.
Panic began to show itself in foreign markets. In
April 1907 the market of Egypt collapsed. Blocks of shares of
stock were waiting to be sold, although the market was so full
of paper that the offer of shares in any security sent quota-
tions downward. It was known that some of the smaller houses
were on their last legs, and when the panic became acute, one
of these firms suspended payments. In May a run by depositors
at Cairo began, and one of the important banks was forced to
suspend payments. They had been working beyond their means of
obtaining outside capital.
About the same time the Japanese market began to fall
into panic. When the "speculation" was allowed to go too far,
and in face of the fact that no help cauld be obtained,
certain Japanese banks had to suspend payments. By October German
found herself in straightened circumstances, and felt the
1
grip of her biggest panic since 1857. Money rates were boosted
to the breaking point, firms of all kinds failed, payments were
suspended by many morej the whole Empire was affected. This
panic was felt throughout Europe, Asia and Africa. Chile was
also affected. Exchange on London had previously fallen,
currency was depreciated greatly, and a run on the banks of
Chile followed, resulting in the failure of many. Short-date
1. Hamburg Correspondent - London Economist, Oct. 26,
1907 - A. D. Noyes - Financial History of U. S.
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Treasury notes were issued by the Government to aid the
threatened firms. Holland and Denmark also passed through a
thorough convulsion of the credit markets. Banks failed in
both countries.
Thy had the markets refused to recognize the signs of
the panic? Y/ise-acres in banking circios in America had been
firmly converted to the belief that such years as 1873 or 1893
could not happen again. This belief rested on the great econo-
mic growth, the establishment of the gold standard, and the
1
enlarged and apparently secure resources of the banks. But
the real cause, which was not considered by these men, was the
unprecedented strain on credit. Panics had been predicted
in 1901 and 1903, but the predictions had failed. When a panic
w&s again predicted for 1907, it was questioned by the finan-
ciers as well as the public. Besides thism the year 1907
did not come within the "twenty year cycle" which had been the
length of periods between former panics. Perhaps the increased
demand for capital immediately following the year 1904 had a
great deal to do with the shortening of this period of immunity.
Early in 1907 the country found itself in an atmosphere
of apprehension. In June an $8,000, 000 iron manufacturing
company located in New York City went under. In mid-summer
two New York City loans, offered for public subscription,
failed to find a market. In the autumn the New York Street
Railway Company, capitalized at $52,0^0,000, went into the hands
o
of receivers. „ . . _ . . „,
1. Commercial panics, Past & Future Atlantic konthly,
October, 1906.
z. New York Financial Chronicl e, June 29, 1907.
3. Testimony in trial of Charles W, korse. U. S.
r.irnuit. CI.. Cct .. g3 , 19Q8 .
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Charles W. Morse, (a New York banker) had bought up,
in New York City, half a dozen banking institutions of second
rank. He used the stock in one bank as the collateral on which
to raise money to purchase another. This "chain-banking,"
as it is called, caused the Mercantile National Bank, on the
sixteenth of October, to appeal to the Clearing House for aid,
and in response 8 committee from the Clearing House began to
investigate the situation. The Clearing House then announced
that it would tide the bank over provided the directors of
the bank would resign, as the predicament in which the bank
now found itself had been brought about through the speculation
in copper stock by the president of the institution with the
1
bank's funds. This publicity caused bankers to look into the
condition of their customer banks, and a general overhauling
of banks' accounts took place.
Suddenly, on October 21, the National Bank of Commerce
announced that it would no longer accept checks for collection
drawn on the Knickerbocker Trust Company. The morning of the
twenty-second of October saw a great run on the "barred"
institution, and by noon the Knickerbocker closed its doors.
The next day every trust company in the city was besieged by
panic-stricken depositors.
Under the laws of New York, trust companies were not
required to keep cash reserves against deposits. They could
1. Testimony in trial of Charles W. Morse, U. 3.
Circuit Ct. Oct. el, 1908.
z. A. D. Iloyes - p 367.

invest deposit-funda in real estate, buy and sell stocks and
bonds, lend money on reality; but these power's were either
denied outright to deposit banks by law or were most scrap*
uloudLy restricted. The trust companies found their authority
in a section in the Trust Company Act, probably not intended
for this application, but which provided for their acceptance
cf "any and all such powers and trusts of whatever nature and
description as may be conferred upon or intrusted or committed
to it by any person or persons." This then covered their power
to deposit and invest. Between 1899 and 1906 the number of
1
trust companies increased from sixty-eight to eighty-six.
They could offer interest which the banks, because of their
necessary fifteen and twenty five per cent, re servesj could net
afford to pay. Although these trust companies were not members,
they cleared through the Clearing House.
As early as 190z the Clearing House expressed its purpose
or requiring the trust companies to maintain a large reserve.
In February, 1903, this institution passed a rule to the effect
that trust companies must maintain a cash reserve of ten per
cent. This brought on a controversy. The banks were accused
of attempting to ruin their competitors, and nearly all the
trust companies broke off Clearing House relations. This meant
that the trust companies would still lack any required reserve,
that the payment of balances would necessarily be paid over
1. A. D. Noyes -'p 068
N. Y. Financial Chronicle $£ch. 14, 1903.

their own counters, and that a complete reversion to the old.
banking era would ensue. And this body of institutions poss-
essed a larger aggregate sum of depositors than the whole system
of banks had possessed in 1873. Of their clients, a great
number were savings' depositors, and a class of people who are
easily alarmed. All of these conditions helped very materially
in bringing on critical times.
The Knickerbocker Trust Company closed its doors on
October £2. By night many other trust companies sought aid
from the banks. This action, chronicled in the morning's papers
brought on a run at once, and by noon of October twenty-third,
lines of terror stricken depositors stood before the doors of
nearly every trust company in New York City. Lines of these
agitated depositors had formed in many cases before the bank
had opened its doors in the morning. The main competitors of
the Knickerbocker in catering to the "uptown" clientage
was the Lincoln Trust Company with demand deposits aggregating
£16,000,000. The Trust Company of America had accumulated
demand deposits of about $4^,000,000. The Lincoln Trust and
the Trust Company of America were the victims of probably the
most exciting and spectacular "run" ever seen in our financial
history. The creditor banks had no other means of drawing
their obligations on the besieged banks than by stationing
1. A. D. Noyes - p o70.
c A. D. Noyes - p 37}.
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bank messengers in the lines of the frightened depositors and
thus awaiting their turn at the window.
Mr. Cortelyou, Secretary of the Treasury, quickly saw
the gravity of the situation, and coming from Washington to
New York
t
he arranged to deposit $35,000,000 of the surplus of
the government with the national banks, by whom it was
1
advanced to trust, companies against their liquid assets.
This sum, however, was mostly engulfed in the payment of de-
positors, the Trust Company of America alone oaying off
2
depositors to the amount of $34,000,000. These runs continued
for fourteen days, the depositors standing in line all through
the night. Ten million dollars in cash, supplied by other
institutions, went with the rest. The run was not stopped
until the sixth of November, the older companies organizing to
help the younger, hard-pressed institutions. Six banks in
Greater New York and three trust companies besides the Knick-
erbocker closed their doors, and a general run on the saving*
s
banks caused the application of the "sixty days notice rule"
for the withdrawal of deposits.
On October twenty-fourth the panic swept over the
Exchange. Restriction of credit, caused by the precarious
position of the banks, reached an extent, which, if continued,
it meant s-eneral insolvency, for the Stock Exchange
4.
community.
1, Secretary Cortelyou, report in U. S. Senate, Jan.29,'0
2, ' Cakliegh Thome Pres. of Trust Co. of America,
Nov. G, 1907.
S. Annual Report of N. Y. State Banking Dept. Dec. 31, 19ff7.
4. N. Y. Evening Post, Oct. U6, 1907.
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community demand loans rose to 1^5 per cent. J. P. Morgan came
to the rescue of the President of the Stock Exchange by the
release of $25,000,000 at high rates to meet the pressing needs.
This timely action prevented the close of the exchange. But
the banking crisis had just begun. Interior banks took alarm
and withdrew their balances with the New York banks, which
1
was a repetition of history.
The New York Banks on Saturday, October twenty-sixth,
determined to take out Clearing House Certificates to help the
hard-pressed banks through the loan of cash reserves to their
neighbors, but which was to bring about the suspension of cash
payments by the Clearing House. Before the panic was over,
there was about $88,4^0,000 of certificates in use. Nearly
every clearing house in the country took similar action.
Reserves of the New York banks fell to a deficit of $54,103,000
by November 3, as against $16,545,000 in the panic year of
1593. Cash was hoarded by individuals, and it is estimated
5
that by such action $296,000,000 was withdrawn from circuit, t ion.
This caused the issue of clearing house certificates by banks
of Pittsburg and Chicago, where the pay-roll of manufactures
meant the payment of largo sums of money, amounting to about
$96,000,000 in this makeshift currency.
The premium on currency was four per cent. This caused
a stampede to draw on Europe for gold. The exchange rate in
London in November was 4.91, but in. spite of the fact, in two
1. A. D. Noyes - p 373.
2. A. D. Noyes - p 374.
a. Secretary Cortelyou Report to U. 3. Senate Jan. 29,
1908.

months $9u,000,000 was imported from Europe into this country
1
because of the rate. The reserve of gold in the Bank of
England fell $31,000,000 in two weeks after the New York panic
had begun, and on November seventh, the bank rate rose to seven
per cent, for the first time since 167<j. Even a* high
a rate as eight per cent, or nine per cent, was intimated if
the outflow of gold continued to New York. Banking author-
ities in England said that it was high time for Federal inter-
vention in this country, ana for the guarantee of banks by
o
the government.
As is usually the case, the markets were passing out
from the actual crisis at the moment when despair seemed to
have gained full sway in the financial community. The futile
expedient of the government on the issue of §50,000,000
Government Bonas and §100,000,000 in one year notes was re-
sorted to, and these were offered to the banks with the view
4
of providing a basis of a new circulation. This action
was caused by the clamor fir help, and on the recommendation of
Lombard Street. Only $z4,998,040 of the bonds and $15,436,5U0
of the one year notes was taken. It soon appeared how foolish
it
this recourse was, anu how/brought aboutcomplicat ions rather
than ameliorating the strain. This caused the government to
5
withdraw their loans suddenly from the market. With the
arrival of the first shipments of gold from Europe, the acute
1. N. Y. Financial Chronical, Nov. y, 1907.
London Economist, Nov. 9, 1907.
3. London Economist, Nov. 9, 1907.
4. Secretary Cortelyou Report.
5. . D. Noyes - p o76.
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stage of the panic ended.
There were left the long after-effects, of which the panic
itself was only a premonitory symptom, and which came in sight
only gradually, along with assertions that they would not come at
all, as is usurlly the case on occasions of this kind.
The panic of 1907 resembled that of 1875. Capitalists re-
fused to believe that the critical period was at an end. The
panic was unlike that of 1893 in that it did not follow a period
of misgiving and uncertainty, leading to the confirmation of the
belief, on the part of the community, in the cerxeinty of pro-
longed reaction and depression. The sequel of 1907 was necessarily
recognized. It is a matter of record, v/hich shows an increase in
commercial failures of thirty per cent during the last month of
that year as compared with 1906. The first nine months of 1908
showed an increase of fifty per cent over 1907 in the number of
failures, and of one hundred and twenty per cent in liabilities
during the same period. A vast shrinkage of the iron trade showed
itself to a percentage of fifty per cent. The traffic receipts in
railways also furnish a very interesting set of data, and may well
be taken as criteria of commercial activity during the period.
The decrease for the full year of 1908 showed a shrinkage of
$290,000,000. Checks dravm on banks decreased seventeen per cent.
Textiles decreased twenty five per cent in output; a ten per cent
decrease in wages with a reduction of twenty five to thirty per
cent in prices, and a great increase in the number of unemployed
persons were other factors in the after-effect of the panic.
I
Bradstreet 1 s report
.

18.
Fully a year passed before the financial markets and the
combinations of capital were willing to ia*iize or recognize
changed conditions.
Little need be said here of the organizing of the "Sun-
shine Movement," "Prosperity League," and "Re-employment
Day. The objects were to make members of the community feel
that if they thought they would be prosperous, that very
1
thing would come to pass.
The United States Steel Corporation refused to change
the price of steel, although their sales amounted to only about
fifty per cent.. of thdr pre-panic sales. It is a matter of
record that B. H. Gary, Chairman of the Board of Directors
of the corporation said that the fact of variation in demand
and supply does not necessitate a change in price, and that
1907 prices were to be maintained.
On the exchange, repeated outbursts of speculation
occurred, each of which affirmed the passitg of the after-effects
of the panic. In November, Lr. Taft was elected President
of the United States by a large vote. The speculative public
r^shcJ again intc the Stock Exchange, speculating capitalists
again resumed the manipulations of the market, and the "bulls :i
placed the stocks on a higher level than in either 1906 or 1907.
The end of this demonstration came in the early months
of 1909 when prices of steel came down, and when the abnormal
transactions on the exchange ended. In the future the trend
1. A. D. Noyes - p ,578.
2« Statement of £. H. Gary, April 9, 1908.
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of the country's history will be fixed by the interplay
of its natural resources, by the capacity for production,
industry, inventiveness, and versatility of the people, and
by their disposition to rash exploitation of such resources,
and towards venturesome experiments with capital. Such it
has been in the past, and so it shall be in the future.

20.
PART TWO
WHAT IS THE REMEDY ?
The currency commission of the American Bankers' Associa-
tion, after a long and careful study of the financial situation,
has reached the conclusion that the only kind of currency which
will respond easily to the need for a better medium of exchange
is that secured by the assets of a bank in the same manner as
deposits are secured. The principles upon which the commission
unanimously agreed are, in brief, as follows:
1. A credit currency should be issued by the national banks
of the country under proper conditions.
2. A bank note is essentially the same in principle as a
deposit payable on demand.
3. It is important in any plan seeking to provide a more
flexible currency that no measures should be taken that would
impair the market value of United States Bonds.
4. Credit notes should be taxed at a rate that will produce
a guarantee fund sufficient to redeem the notes of failed banks.
5. Banks should keep the same reserve against credit notes
outstanding as is now required by law against deposits.
6. Active daily redemption of credit currency is the proper
and only means of .naking it elastic, preventing redundancy, and
automatically adjusting its value to the actual requirements of
commerce . *
Frequent bank failures are due not so much to the form
of demand liabilities of the bank as to the nature of the loans
^ lMyron ~T~. Herrick. Panic of 1907 and Some of Its Lessons.
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that the bank makes. Until the similarity between the bank note
and the deposit is understood, there is little hope for any ra-
tional reform of our banking system.
There is no vital difference between a deposit and a bank
note, and yet very few people can recognize any essential like-
ness between the two. Let us take a specific case. A jobber
sella a bill of goods on time, sixty or ninety days, and desires
to obtain the present use of his funds. He takes the note to
the bank, and has it discounted. He does not want gold, but
something that he can or will use in payment of his obligations.
He receives credit on the books of the bank for the facte of his
note, less the discount. This credit is a demand liability of
the bank and is used by the depositor, by means of checks, as
a medium of exchange. It is currency in every true sense, hav-
ing the same effect on prices as a like amount of bank notes.
Suppose, however, that the bank has authority to issue, and the
jobber desired and received, bank notes in exchange for the notes
discounted. The result to the bank and to the volume of currency
is precisely the same. The bank note takes the place of a de-
posit.''" It is true that the deposits do not circulate over as
large a territory as do the bank note, but in case of payment
a distance from the banks, drafts may be drawn on the deposit
account and tendered in payment of the debt.
In case of circulating notes, tne holder of each and every
bank note cannot tell as to the solvency of the banks by whom
they are issued, so necessarily there must bo a guarantee fund
provided to secure absolutely every bank note issued, irrespec-
tive of the soundness of the institution upon which it is
*¥yron T. Herri ck. Panic of 1907 and Some of Its Lessons.
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Although approximately 95 per cent, of the business of
the country is done by means of bank deposits, and will contin-
ue to be the case because of the convenience of checks as a
form of currenc, yet when currency is meeded it is imperative
that it be supplied, and the banks should always be in a posi-
tion to satisfy that need. In order to give the community all
over the country the service required, the freedom of note
issue ...ust be given to the banks with no more restriction than
the deposit currency freedom.
An elastic currency is needed more particularly in the
smaller towns and the farming communities, where the moving of
crops necessitates fluctuation in the amount of currency. This
brings to our attention the question of the asset currency, which
although not a new thing by any means, is rather a stranger to
us. Canada, France, Scotland, and Germany all make provision
for this sort of bank notes. Dunbar has said concerning the
asset curency of the Reichsbank of Germany, in part: "The
effectiveness of the elastic currency in times of crisis has
never been severely tested, but it has been found to meet, with
much success, exceptional, temporary demands for currency, which,
under a rigid system of issue, like that of the bank of Eng-
land, could only have been satisfied by the withdrawal ' of specie
or notes from the reserve."
^
The plan proposed by this currency commission of the
American Bankers Association is the result of years of exper-
ience and study on the part of the leading bankers of the
country, and for this reason, if for no other, merits the most
l
4Y.yron T. Kerrick- Panic of 1907 and Some of Its Consequences
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careful consideration.
"If our system had been such that the country bank first,
then the reserve city bank, and finally the central reserve city
bank, could have supplied some sort of credit notes in payment
of their deposits, the situation in 1907 would have been entirely
different. With such an elastic currency, there would be no
variation in the volume of credits. Reserve money in the banks,
which was ample for the deposits, would have been ample for the
credit notes if they had been available . *1
There is no need to go further into this discussion of the
need for a new revision of our banking system. It is obvious-
ly wrong, and by necessity must undergo a complete change. Let
us then consider the new legislation during the year 1908.
Wm. narrett Ridgely, Comptroller of the Currency.
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PART THREE
ACT OP MAY 30, 1908.
After the panic of 1907, efforts were made for an improve-
ment in the currency and banking system. When Congress convened
in the spring of 1908, Senator Aldrich of Rhode Island intro-
duced a bill into the Senate. On April 7, 1908, soon after
Congress convened, the bill was passed by the Senate, after the
section in regard to circulation based on railroad bonds had
been stricken out.^-
The bill was then placed before the House, and was refer-
red to the committee on Banking and Currency. After a lengthy
discussion by many leading bankers and financiers of the country,
it was finally tabled and apparently killed. Those in control
of the program in the house took the matter out of the hands of
the committee, and Mr. Vreeland from New York State introduced
a new bill which the House promptly passed. But the Senate
had to be reckoned with, and as the House had refused to accept
the original bill, so did the Sena.te now refuse to pass the
Vreeland bill. Although there were conferences between the
members of both branches, they could come to no agreement.
As the session was nearing a close, and it was felt that
some sort of financial legislation must be passed at this time,
efforts were resorted to for forcing such legislation. To insure
the success of this scheme, a qualified form of bribery was
employed. The public buildings bill, commonly known as the
"pork bill", was held over the heads of the members as a club
^-Bankers* Magazine, June, 1908.
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to force them to come to an agreement on the currency bill."^"
This "club" was the appropriation for public buildings, which
naturally every member was striving to get in order to stand
well with his constituents. M A more degrading and humiliating
exhibition of unscrupulous abuse of the power of legislation by
a national body it would be hard to find In all history." 2 With
this as a measure of coercion, the new currency legislation
was passed.
On May 28, 1908, the House of Representatives, after a
debate of one hour, passed a bill, in which the Senate concurred,
to amend the National Banking law. It had not been considered
by any regular committee of either branch of Congress, but hast-
ily put together by a Republican caucus committee as a political
rather than a financial expedient, so that the Republicans might
be able to say in the coming campaign that they had made provi-
sions for an MEmergsncy currency" in case of a renewal of the
stringency of the preceding autumn. The bill consisted of a
part of a measure prepared somewhat earlier by Congressman Vree-
land of New York, and of a part of the Aldrich bill which had
previously passed the Senate. It embraces the principles of an
"asset currency," which neither house of Congress ever previously
accepted. It must therefore be considered a step in the right
direction. The bill was signed by the President.
3
This gives us an idea of hbw the bill passed Congress,
secured the President's signature, and became a law. The Act
^3ankeVs r "Magazine
,
June, 1908.
<2New York Journal of Commerce.
3 Horace White, Money and Banking, Appendix A.
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was approved May 30, 1908, and the bill has come to be called
after the date of its approval.. In order to see the relation
of the bill better, the summary of such sections of .that bill
relating to issue of national bank notes is hereby quoted from
.^r. Horace White in his book entitled i..one y and Banking.
"Thus the Act of may 30, 1908 authorized in two differ-
ent ways, the issue of national bank notes additional to those
heretofore existing, namely:
1. 3y the pledging of any securities including commercial
paper, representing actual commercial transactions and bearing
two or more responsible signatures, and running not more than
four months. Such securities and paper shall remain in the cus-
tody ")f the national currency association to which the bank
applying for the circulating notes belongs. The amount of notes
issuable thereon shall not exceed 75 per cent, of the cash value
thereof. All the banks in the currency association are jointly
and severally liable for all the circulating notes so issued.
2. ^y the transfer to the custody of the Treasurer of the
United States of any bond, or other interest bearing obligations,
of any state of the United States, or of any legally authorized
bonds of any city, town, county, municipality, or district in
the United States. Against securities, circulating notes may be
issued not exceeding 90 per cent, of their market value.
All the securities in both categories are subject to the
approval of the secretary of the Treasury, who may require addi-
tional securities, or a substitution of other securities, in any
case where he deems the existing ones snsuf ficient . Tae national
currency association may exercise the same powers and make the
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same requirementsin respect to the securities deposited with
them by any bank in their respective associations.
Bank notes in either of these categories shall be subject
to a tax of five per cent, for each month until a tax of ten
per cent, per annum is reached, which rate shall continue as
long as they remain outstanding. For all such notes the issuing
bank must keep a redemption fund in the Treasury of the United
States of ten per cent., i.e., five per cent, more for the amount
required for redemption of notes issued against government
bonds. The Treasury assumes the responsibility of redeeming
the notes of all failed banks. No notes have been issued under
this act.
"
This, then, is a summary of the measure which caused most
of the debate in Congress over the bill. There is no reason
why I should take the time and space to discuss the bill as it
passed Congress. It might be interesting to read the debate
on the bill in the reports of the 60th Congress, first session,
on pages 7065-7077 of volume 42, part 8. The me a suae hinged on
the question of emergency currency, of the issue of national
bank notes by the Treasury on the basis of the bonds heretofore
listed. It is unnecessary to go over the bill as it aassed,
inasmuch as the original Aldrich .ill has been discussed, and
the changes have been noted.
It is also of great interest to note that the very section
of the Aldrich-Vree Land bill of iAay 30, 1908, which caused the
greatest debate and discussion, not to mention a large amount of
criticism, has never been used. That is to say, under that
(
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section which enabled the issuance of an ^emergency currency",
no national bank notes have been issued. It may be said with
a great deal of truth that the bill has helped our financial
condition in a large measure. It has stood like a monument,
watching the fluctuation of our money market, and has ever been
ready to put forth its power of note issue. That very fact
has, in my opinion, had a steadying influence on the money
market of our country, and if it has, the bill must be considered
at least a step toward a better basis of currency and banking
in this country. The bill will expire June 30, 1914.
Section 17 of the bill provided that a commission be
created to be called "National Monetary Commission," to be
composed of nine members of the Senate, to b® appointed by the
Presiding Officer of the Senate thereof, and nine members of the
House of Representatives, to be appointed by the Speaker thereof:
and any vacancy on the commission shall be filled in the same
manner as the original appointment.
The commission appointed is as follows:
Senators Representatives
Wilson 77. Aldrich, Rhode Island E. B. Vreeland, New York
Eugene Male, Maine J. W. Weeks, Massachusetts
P. C. Knox, Pennsylvania Theo. E. Burton, Ohio
J. C. Burroughs, Michigan G. F. Burgess, Texas
J. 7/. Bailey, Texas A. ?. Pujo , Louisiana
H. D. Morey, Mississippi L. P. Padgett, Tennessee
H. M. Teller, Colorado R. ff. Bonynge , Colorado
F. P. Flint, California J. McLachlan, Calfornia
J. P. Talliaferro, Florida Geo. 7/. Prince, Illinois
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:art four
THE ALDRICH PLAN .
The Aldrich-Vreeland Act was passed May 30, 1908, as a
temporary measure for protection against severe money stringen-
cies or panics that might occur prior to the enactment of a per-
manent measure pursuant to the recommendations of the National
Monetary Commission. Therefore this Act should not be critized
as though it were designed to be a permanent addition to our
currency laws.''"
The Monetary Commission created by the Act of May 30,
1906, had been hard at work on the preparation of a measure which
would meet the demand of currency reform. During 1911 while
Congress was in session, the measure, as prepared by the Commis-
sion, was introduced.
Nelson W. Aldrich, introduced in Senate suggestions to
overcome the past difficulties. He was of the opinion that the
banking law had become obsolete, and that it should be mod-
ernized. To this ernd he submitted to the Senate an outline
for a plan of betterment.
The essential feature of it was the establishing of a
banking institution which was to be the fiscal agent of the
government with a capital not exceeding $300,000,000. It was
to be called the "Reserve association of America." Its stock
could be subscribed for and owned solely by the national banks
of the United States, in exact proportion to their capital, and
was not transferable. The main office was to be at Washington.
^Victor Morawetz - Banking and Currency Problem, p. 64
^Horace~77hTte
,
Money and Banking, n. 437.
t
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The earnings were to be paid to the stock holders at first, to
the extent of four percent., and subsenuently to the extent of
five per cent., on the paid in capital; all other earnings were
to go to the government. No bank was compelled to join the
association.
All banks who subscribed would be grouped into associations,
not less than ten banks in each, and they must have an aggregate
capital of not less than ^5,000,000. These groups were to be
subdivided into fifteen divisions called districts. A board
of directors was to be elected annually by each bank having one
representative and one vote, without reference to the size of
the bank.
In each of the fifteen districts there was to be a branch of
the Reserve Association, governed by a board of directors chosen
by the local associations composing that district. Additional
Directors equal to one-third of the members of the local asso-
ciations were to be appointed to represent the business interests
of the locality other than the banking interests.
A board of forty-five directors would control the Reserve
Association. Six of these would be the governors, two deputy-
governers, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Com-
merce and Labor, and the Comptroller of the local associations.
The governor and the two deputy governors were. to be selected by
the President of tne United States from a list submitted by the
board of directors. Each branch would have a manager and a
deputy-manager appointed by trie governor with the approval of an
executive committee of the central board of directors.
The government of the United States and those national banks

31.
owning stock in the reserve association would be the sole de-
positors in said association, and the business of said associa-
tion whould be confined to the government and the subscribing
banks. The association could rediscount any commercial paper
bearing the endorsement of any bank having a deposit with it,
provided that such paper had been made thirty days prior to the
date of rediscount, and had not more than twenty-eight days
more to run. It could also rediscount for any depositing bank,
any paper arising out of commercial transactions running not
more than four months, but such paper must be guaranteed by the
local association, of which the bank seeking rediscount was a
member. Any member of a local association could apply to that
association for a guaranty of the commercial paper which it des-
ires to rediscount. The total amount of guaranties by a local
association whould not exceed the aggregate capital and surplus
of the banks forming the local association.
The Reserve Association could also in certain cases discount
the direct obligation of a depositing bank when accoaipanied by
satisfactory securities, the loan not to exceed two thirds of the
actual value of the pledged securities. The association would
pay no interest on deposits. The rate of discount was to be
uniform. The association would buy from, or sell to, its deposi-
tors, foreign bills of exchange, arising from commercial trans-
actions, running not more than ninety days and bearing the sig-
natures of at least three responsible parties. It could have
agencies in foreign countries. All government funds were to be
deposited with the association, the government disbursements
being made by drafts or checks drawn on it.
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The section of the bill on the note issue was important
and interesting. The national banks could maintain their ex-
isting issues of circulating notes, but there were to be no
further issued beyond those then outstanding, nor could notes
voluntarily recalled be issued again. For a period of one year,
the Reserve Association should offer to purchase at not less
than par the two per cent, bonds held by national banks as
securities against their circulation, which the currency privilege
attached to said bonds, and assume all responsibility for said
notes, it being the policy of the United States to retire such
bond-secured circulation and to substitute therefor notes of the
Reserve Association, subject to certain rates of taxation. Of
the notes issued by the association, one-third must be covered
by gold or other lawful money, and the remaining two-thirds by
the United States bonds or bankable commercial paper of speci-
fied kind. These circulating notes v;ere to constitute a first
line upon all the assets of the Reserve Association.
These are the main provisions of the bill as presented
before Congress in 1911. The advantages in the plan are numer-
ous, but the disadvantages somewhat over-weigh them.
In fact, although under a different name, this was nothing
more taan a central o ink plan. Probably "Reserve Association"
was a better name, since it better indicated the principal
object in view, and since it avoided popular prejudices attached
to "Central Bank." 1
Its first endeavor was to strengthen the whole body of
•'Horace" White
,
Money and Banking, p. 441.
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banking by economizing the cash reserves of the country and
making them available for the rrotection of banks and business
men at all times, especially in times of squalls. It endeavored
and I believe well, to put an end to the .notive of banks to
make runs on each other, or for depositors to make runs on the
banks. The bill gave us a way to refund the two per cent, bonds
into three per cent, in a manner which would allow the Reserve
Association to dispose of the bonds and so eventually get rid of
the bond basis of our circulation. Another advantage of the
plan is tne aim to establish a discount market for the discount
of commercial paper which measures up to the standard, and a
flexible currency to be based on general banking assets and the
automatic return of the government surplus revenue to the money
market from day to day.
There is every reason why the plan would have been a stead-
ying influence on the market, in that it would tend to prevent
trade reactions because of the standardization of commercial
paper discounted by a more mutual supervision of the banks in
the local association, and by creating more responsibility and
.uore conservative action on the part of the bankers. Because
of the banking reserve centered in such a large and strong insti-
tution, there would be no limit to the amount of currency issued,
no delay in its issue, and no inability to redeem on demand.
The chance for crisis would be lessened, although I do not be-
lieve that panics, inasmuch as they are a state of mind-, can be
legislated against.
Perhaps tne objection that politics would have played too
large a part in the management of the plan has some foundation.
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However, while nearly any institution under government management
is more or less influenced by politicians, it is hardly likely
that a man in whom as much trust is placed as in the President of
the United States would allow politics to dictate as to his ap-
pointments of the governor and the deputies of such an institu-
tion. I do not believe that v/e can easily picture a contest
between the President and an institution owned by thousands of
banks ail over the country.
Professor Wm. A. Scott in his monograph in the American
Economic Review for June, 1911, says: "Persons who suspect that
any measure proposed by Senator Aldrich must necessarily be de-
signed to play into the hands of the interests will look for a
"joker" in his plan for the management and control of the pro-
osed institution. They will have considerable difficulty in find
ing it, however. Wall Street could control the new institution
only by absolutely controlling a majority of the banks that will
purchase stock in the institution, and even then its control would
be tempered by the Federal Government, and by the representatives
of the commercial and industrial world provided for in the
scheme .
"
This Aldrich plan was discussed in both houses of Congress
and by the Currency and Banking Committee in each branch, but
finally, after a long and bitter debate, the measure was tabled.
The National Monetary' s plan for a jGentral Bank as pro-
posed under the Aldrich plan did not meet with the approval
in Congress, and its work for better currency reform went for
nothing.
During the last few years we have not heeded to any great
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extent such legislation as would permit an issue of elastic curre
ncy, because canditions in our country have made such a means
unnecessary. For that reason perhaps, our legislation has been
sufficient
.
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PART FIVE
THE FINANCIAL SITUATION .
The Act of May 30, 1908, was intended only for temporary
purposes, and was passed with the idea of affording a measure
for improvement in currency conditions until better and more
permanent legislation could be passed by Congress. Our banking
and currency system still had its defects. The Currency Commis-
sion of the American Bankers Association had been deliberating
and considering the question for some time, with the following
conclusions
:
1. In the first place our currency is too rigid; that is,
there must be a greater investment in government bonds than
can be issued in currency which in a measure impairs rather than
increases our power to aid commerce and trade. Then we can
redeem our national bank notes only in the cities of central
reserve banks, unless those notes become unfit for circulation.
It is certainly unsound banking.
2. Under the present system there is no cooperation ainon.f
the br.nks. This is not felt until undue financial strain sets
in, but in such times of stress each bank is thrown independently
of other banks, when under a system of cooperation the b:.inks
might better help each other.
3. A great defect in the present situation is the fact that
our present system of reserve is unsound in that during periods
of stringency and panic, the necessity arises for the individual
protection of the reserve of each bank and competition is forced,
for in order to maintain themselves, each bank contends against
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each other bank. Thus a great deal of this reserve money goes
into small hoarding, depriving and destroying, in times of
stringency, the strength and power which might better be gained
be cooperation and a pooling of reserves for mutual support of
the banks and the common good of the public.
4. Jnder the present system there is no provision made for
any substitute for legal reserve money as a medium of circulation
other than the national bank notes secured by government bonds,
whose inflexibility has alreadjr been pointed out. The use of
the legal reserve money in circulation without any substitute
forms an economic waste.
5. There is very little elasticity In the circulation, the
amount of commercial transactions could remain constant, there
would be no need for this elasticity, but there is always either
an increase or a decrease in the volume of business, and this
means either a surplus or a deficiency, with the latter too
often the case. This is best illustrated by the crop moving
time. At the fall season when grain is being harvested in the
western part of the country, there is a great demand for money
in that part of the United States for the expense of moving the
crops. Then it is that money flows from the east to west, some-
times making a strain on the eastern banks. Tnat means that
money will become "tight" and rates of interest will rise, and
that in some measure commerce will suffer. After the grain has
been harvested and the agriculturists get their money for their
crops, the deposits which they make in the western banks swell
the reserves, and the money surplus is shipped back east. Then
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money is^asy," rates are lowered, and as sometimes is the case
the money becomes a M drug M on the market. An elastic currency
for issue at such times when it is needed, and the retirement of
the same amount when there is no longer a demand for it, would put
an end to this shifting of the money from one section of the
country to the other. Loans would then be normal, and rates of
interest would remain constant.
6. The banks so restricted In the use of their legal reserves
suffer, because it prohibits their lending when unusual demands
are made upon them, as the reserves cannot be protected by the
substitution of some other kind of satisfactory money, nor can
the reserves be replenished by adequate rediscounting facilities
which would enable the conversion of their available assets into
cash for that reserve.
7. Another glaring defect in our present system appears in
the methods in our independent treasury system. The government
acts as a partial custodian of its own funds, which results in
irregular withdrawals of money from the bank reserves and from
circulation, materially interfering with the even course of
business
.
8. There is no open market for commercial paper. 'With
such a market, banks would be enabled to purchase commercial
paper with their surplus funds or, on the other hand, sell in that
market the paper held by them when it becomes expedient to in-
crease or strengthen their reserve or to meet the demands made
upon them.
9. Then we are weak in that we lack provision for the estab-
lishment of American branches in foreign countries. Such branch-
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es are really necessary for the development of our foreign trade.
On the other hand the present system has some distinct
advantages. They may in part be enumerated as follows:
1. The present system enables each community to organize and
control its own banking facilities.
2. It has so furnished the government with a market for its
bonds, that the government has been able to reduce by two- thirds
the rate of interest. The bonds have not only been kept on a par
through this means, but in the case of the two per cent, bonds, a
premium has been obtained.
3. It has provided the country with a stable bank note cir-
culation of uniform value, which although it is defective in some
ways, is strong and sound.
One of the most important things to bo considered is the
separation of our banking and currency system from political
influence. It has been the experience of foreign nations that
results can be better obtained by the establishment of a pri-
vately owned central organization, dominated and controlled by
the government. Take for instance the Imperial Bank of Germany
or the Bank of France.
The Imperial Bank of Germany is owned wholly by private
share holders and politics does not play a part, but it is under
the exclusive control of the government, and the officers of the
bank are considered as government employees. The frank is allowed
a fixed amount of uncovered notes. For all above that sum it
must have in its reserves an equal amount of cash, but this is
not like the ft ink of England, an inflexible rule. The bank
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may issue uncovered notes in excess. of the prescribed limits
by paying a tax of five per cent, per annum on the excess, but
its reserve must not at any time be less than one-third of its
outstanding circulation. This elastic clause has been vindicated
by experience. The Imperial Bank is required to give its notes
in exchange for gold coin or for bullion, and its notes are
legal tender. All note-issuing banks are required to receive
each others 1 notes at par, and to redeem their own notes at
Berlin or Frankfort, as well as over their own counters. The
net profits are divided between the shareholders and the imper-
ial treasury In proportion fixed by law. The Imperial Bank has
many branches.^ Here is an example of a strong institution where
politics does not dominate the control and management.
The situation at the present time has been set forth in
detail. We realize what the defects of our system are. We know
what must be done to better the conditions in this country, and
with this in view we can look at future currency and banking
legislation in a much more critical light.
And now we are prepared to take up the more recent currency
legislation which was passed by the present Congress on December
23, 1913. Someone has said that this new piece of banking re-
form is the greatest bit of legislation which has been passed
since the adoption of the Declaration Of Independence. That
is a rather early prediction, and the measure must be given a
thorough try-out before that fact can be established.
Horace White, Money and Banking, p. 399.
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?AR2 SIX
THE NSW BANK ACT.
The Feaeral Reserve Act, the cost recent currency legisla-
tion In this country, was introduced into the House of Represent-
atives on June 26, 1913. This bill, known as the Owen-Glass bill,
after the names of Congressman Glass and Senator Owen, was re-
ferred to the Committee on Banking ??nd Currency, and after a few
very slight changes by that Committee, it was passed by the House.
The bill remained in the hands of the committee until September
9, 1913, when it was reported to the House, and passed by it Sept-
ember 17th. The Senate Committee on Banking and Currency had
anticipated the bill's par sage, and had begun hearings on it Sept-
ember 6."*" After the passage of the bill in the House it promptly
appeared in the Senate, which referred if to the Committee on
Banking and Currency, but the members of that committee found it
impossible to agree on a report.
Finally, after a lengthy debate, a decision was reached to
return to the Senate the House Bill and with it two others. One
of thes e bills was endorsed by the Democratic members under the
leadership of Senator Owen, the other by the Republican members
who were joined by a Democrat, Senator Hitchcock. As finally
passed by the Senate and later modified by the conference commit-
tee, the act bears more resemblance tb the Owen draft then to any
1
of the others.
In some quarters, the criticism has been heard that this
piece of legislation has been rushed through Congress without the
nroper amount of consideration and debr.te, but it would seem that
^ Conway and PntTftrRnrL^ - pp-ra-M cm f the-J3ew BanTr Ant .
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such criticism is unjust. This very subject has been before the
country for years. The same principle of reserve banks was em-
bodied in the Aldrich bill, and the reports of the National Mone-
tary Commission have dealt with the subject. Congress and the pub-
lic at large have for a long time had the same principles in mind
when the question of currency was discussed. The testimony taken
by the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, together with the
index, fills three large volumes, with a total of 3259 printed
pages. 1 In addition to this and the reports of the National Mone-
tary Commission, the Pujo committee in the investigation of the
"Money Trust has carefully considered the measure.
DISTkICTS. Under the new law, the United States has been
divided into twelve districts, in each of which has been estab-
lished a Regional Reserve Bank. The capital of each of these banks
must be at least $4,000,000, to be furnished primarily by the mem-
ber banks of the district. National Banks must subscribe, and
state banks and trust companies may subscribe, each to an amount
equal to six per cent. of its own capital and surplus. Such banks
thus subscribing to the capital stock will be known as "member
banks . One half of the subscription must be paid within a limited
time, the balance remaining subject to call. National banks must
comply with the provision of this act within one year or forfeit
their charters. In case the stock subscribed should be inadequate,
the stock may be offered to the public, and if that falls short of
the required amount, the balance will be paid out of the treasury
funds of the government.
iConway and Patterson- Operation of the New Bank Act. p. 20
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Each of these reserve banks is to have its own board of
nine directors, six to be chosen by the member banks and three
to be appointed by the Federal Reserve Board. The Secretary of
the Treasury may order the deposit with the Federal reserve
banks of the general funds in the Treasury of the United States.
They are to act as fiscal agents of the United States. The sec-
retary may also use member banks as depositories, but may not
use b uks for such who are not members of the system. Reserve
requirements of banks joining the system are lowered, while a
part of the reserves are required to be kept on deposit with the
reserve banks, in their own vaults, or both. Earnings are to
be divided between member banks, a surplus fund for the reserve
tank, and a franchise tax to the United States. branches may
be established within its district by any Federal reserve bank.
REDISCOUNTS. The chief work of the reserve banks will
be the rediscount of commercial paper. Paper. of not more than
ninety days maturity may be placed with the reserve banks by
the member banks for the purpose of rediscount, so that the re-
serves of the latter may be increased when needed. The rate of
discount will be fixed by the Federal Reserve Board. This is
without doubt one of the most important provisions in the bill.
Let us consider how it is to operate.
In the fall of the year the banks in the central West need
more money in order to meet the demands made upon them by the
movers of crops. It is then that the banks in that section of the
country must have a greater supply of money to meet this demand.
With the new law in operation, the deposit of good commercial
paper with the reserve bank of which the bank seeking the money is
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a member means the rodlaoounting of that paper, and the auto-
matic replenishing of the member banks reserves to meet the demand.
CONTROL. The control of this new banking system is by far
the most important feature of the act. The succes.-: or failureo
of the measure as a means of remedying our financial problems,
because so much res onsibility and control is placed in the hands
of the reserve board.
The Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Agriculture
,
and the Comptroller of the Currency are to act as "The Reserve
Bank Organization," Whose duty it is to determine upon the locatior
of each bank, the number of banks to be placed, and the extent
of the district. At the time that the law was passed, there was
no comptroller, the office having been left vacant, so the re-
sponsibility lay on Mr. McAdoo, Secretary of the Treasury, and
ufon Mr. Houston, Secretary of Agriculture. These two men immed-
iately began their work, and on the S6th of December, throe days
after the passsge of the act, they issued an announcement desir-
ing information concerning:
1. Geographical convenience, which involves transportation
facilities and rapid and convenient communication with all parts
of the district.
2. Industrial and commercial development and needs of each
section, the general movements, of commodities, transfer of funds
and exchange of credits from such transactions.
3. Established custom and trend of business as developed
by the present system of bank reserves and checking accounts. In
laying out the district and establishing the headquarters for re-
serve banks, every effort will be made to promote business conven-
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is nee and normal movements of trade and commerce.
The committee then began its hearings in the larger cities
of the country. It listened to the arguments for and against the
placing of a bank In such cities, then reviewed the evidence, and
placed the banks where it thought best. The result of the commitee
tee's deliberations has already been seen. ^ot a little surprise
was caused by the instituting of a bank at Atlanta instead of New
Orleans; one at Dallas, Texas; and one at Richmond, Virginia, in-
stead of Louisville, Kentucky. A great many people were also sur-
prised at the placing of twelve banks at the start. Many entertain-
ed the idea that it would be better to siart with eight, and to
wait until business and banking readjusted itself to the change be-
fore any more were opened.
With the operation of this new act, the Federal Reserve Board
has supreme control. It is to be composed of the Secretary of the
Treasury, the Comptroller of the Currency, and five other members
appointed by the President of the United States by and with the
consent of the Senate. Each of the five members receives a salary
of $12,000 annually, exclusive of traveling expenses. The sum of
$7,000 per annum is added to the present salary of the Comptroller.
The control by this board is very broad. It may examine the account:;
and require reports from each reserve bank, and publish a weekly
statement for all reserve banks. It may require one reserve bank
to rediscount the discounted paper of another, so as to shift the
money from one to another; suspend the reserve requirements of both
j
the reserve and member banks; supervise the issue and retirement
of i'ederal reserve notes; and change the number of reserve and
central cities or reclassify the existing ones. It may create new
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reserve districts or rearrange the present ones; appoint three
of the nine directors of each reserve bank, and suspend or remove
any officer or director of such bank; grant to any national bank,
by special permit, the right to act as trustee, administrator, or
registrar, 'and to perform any of the miscellaneous duties falling
naturally .mder the jurisdiction of a supervising body.
The Federal Advisory Council is to be composed of a member
from each district, chosen by the board of directors of the reserve
bank located therein. This council may confer with the board o..
general business conditi ns ; make oral or written representations
to the board; and call for information and make recommendations
upon several specified matters.'''
If the Federal Reserve Board is conservative and has the
foresight to check too much advance in business, there is little
chance of inflation. If it makes loans easy and interest low, and
does not attempt to check business expansion, there is a probility
of inflation. The success of the new system will depend largely
on the board.
Thus we see that indeed a very great amount of responsibil-
ity lies with the board, in fact the board is the one which holds
the reins of the situation.
The question is often asked as to wherein the political
character of the Federal Reserve Board is essentially changed
from the House bill, cince a new administration during its terms
of office can change the character of this board.
When a new administration comes in, it places the Federal
iConway and Patterson, Operation of the New Bank Act.
2 N,A. Weston, Lecture on Banking Law.
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Reserve Board of seven members , a new Secretary of the Treasury,
and possibly, a new Comptroller of the Currency, and during the
1 irst year nominates a new member of the board. Then for two
years the new administration is in the minority.
If in that time the conservative members of the board, ap-
pointed for ten years, have not been able to educate their new
associates to their methods of control, it is time for a seasonable
change, and the administration may then prevail. Behind this are
the regional banks with their six out of nine directors elected by
member banks, and in addition there is the Advisory Council, elect-
ed by the Federal reserve bank directors, one for each Federal
reserve district. Jnder these restraining influences it is safe
to say that it would take two administrations to change the cnar-
acter of the board completely, and if the board were rightly
consti tuti ted at first, it would by practical education convert
radicals to conservatives.^"
EFFECT ON BUSINESS. The introduction of the new system
means a very marked change in banking methods and in business.
A closer scrutiny of paper, new location of reserves, discounting
privileges, more rigid examinations and modifications of account-
ing methods, are among the most important changes for the banks.
All these have a great effect on business. No matter how reason-
able these cnanges appear, conservatism and prejudice must be
taken into c nsideration. Trade movements may not exactly conform
to the new requirements, and a necessary adjustment will have to
take place. This is one argument in favor of the establishing
of many districts at first, in order that business may find its
1 C77. Barron, Wall Street Journal, January 23, 1914.
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new channels and, like a river, cut deep in its bed. However,
it will not be necessary to again distribute by further placing
of any new banks.
PAYMENT OF INTEREST ON DEPOSITS. Although the Federal
reserve banks are n^t forbidden under the act to pay interest, it
hardly seems probable that they will do so. Under the new system
there can be no competition between the national banks for the
business of holding the reserves of the country banks as has hith-
erto been the case, because under the law, the member banks must
deposit their reserves with the reserve bank. This means also that
because of the abundance of funds that the reserve bank may accum-
ulate through the operation of the new law, they will not need
to strive as they have in the past for the deposits. No doubt
the banks will keep an amount above the requirement for the pur-
pose of exchange, but this will be done not at the solicitation
of the reserve banks, but in the interest of the depositing banks
themselves. This fact has caused a great deal of comment and
discussion among the bankers of the country, and in a great many
instances has caused the banks who have been profiting by the
payment of this interest to look at the new bill with some dis-
pleasure .
"Why," asks Professor Weston, "should any of the banks be
interested in getting control of the stock when they do not get
any surplus, but only the six per cent, dividend on their stock?"
And again, he asks, "What is there in the new law to prevent the
banks from paying interest as do the present banks?" This brings
us once more to the subject of control by the Federal Reserve
Board. The managment of the system is, in reality, in the hands

of the bankers themselves. Their representatives, ap should be
the case, constitute a mernvership of the majority of the board,
and if they should so decide, interest may be paid on their de-
posits. If the new law, however, is tending toward that of the
foreign banking system, and such seems to be the case, it is
doubtful if such interest will be paid, for it is contrary to the
olicy of the great central banks of Europe to pay interest on
their deposits.^"
Such is brief is the new law.
It will be impossible to describe all its features here,
but a few specially important points need to be considered. The
question of inflation and contraction has been a topic of absorb-
ing interest ever since the development of our currency system.
This question has never* had more attention or debate than at the
present time, when the dangers of inflation or contraction may be
more or less impending. Again, we should give some time and
reflection to the effect which this new law will have on our many
state and savings banks, and the trust companies, as well as the
many private banking institutions which have become, in many
quarters, all-powerful institutions. Let us then give our atten-
tion to the question of inflation under the new law.
"The first period of inflation has already been felt through
out the civilized world," says Mr. C. W. Barron in the V/all Street
Journal. "It is the proper inflation of confidence begotten
by the fact that American bank reserves, the United States Treas-
ury reserves, and the nearly two billion of gold in the United
States, are to be unshackled under the new bank act for the
commerce and finance of the world." Not in years has been seen
•^Conway .ind" Patterson, Operation of the New Bank Act. p 62.
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such an outpour of investment money, and so sudden a transfor-
mation in finance, as has followed the passage of this act. The
only tning which otops the greatest development is the reiusal to
grant credit to American railroads, and by that the curbing of
our greatest service-transportation.
The amount of gold held by the banks of the country would
prove but small help in time of panic. This was well illustrated
in the panic of 1907. But under the new law, the gold reserve
will not need so much attention. The loans can, through the Fed-
eral reserve banks command cash to pay every iepositor on demand.
Bonds held by the banks in their reserves can be sold in a market
without every other bank competing for this sale.
But there is a real danger in inflation. Under the new
law, the cash requirements drop $260,000 ,000. This is in a
measure controlled by the season of inauguration of the new system
If the system be put into practice in late spring or early summer,
there could be a second outpouring of money for bond investments.
If the inauguration be postponed until fall, it will be within
the power of the Treasury, by withholding its moneys from the
bank, to advance the money rate curb sach investment. 2
The United States Treasury in a large measure commands
this power of inflation. The 150 or 200 millions of money held
by the government which has been withheld from the banks improp-
erly as it belongs to the public might cause as much expansion
by suddenly depositing it in the reserve banks as might as
large an importation of gold from a foreign country. The trans-
fer of this money must come slowly and gradually. Still another
rWall Street Journal, March 13, 1914.
o
C, W. Barron, :.7all Street Journal.

52.
source of inflation is the improper administration in connection^
with the issue of the Federal reserve notes. These notes should
and no Lioubt will be used as a reserve. Ghould they be issued
indiscriminately in forcing expansion, it may mean a sudden de-
preciation and disaster not only to the banks under the law, but
to the whole country. This last chance for inflation is in all
probability remote, because with the present circulation, it
will be considerable time before such Federal reserve notes will
be issued.
Senator Root, in a speech before the Senate assailed the
administration banking and currency bill, and charged the Demo-
cratic Party with attempting to force upon the country the finan-
cial heresies which the electorate has three times repudiated at
the polls. The feature of the speech was the prophecy that
the present measure would give rise to a tremenduous inflation,
following which would be v/holesale liquidation of American secur-
ities held by Europeans, and enormous gold exports.^
This speech which assailed the provisions of the bill must,
however, be taken with a grain of salt. Doubtless politics played
a great part in the attitude wiiich the senator took. This is on-
ly to show, nevertheless, that that condition is made posible
under the new lav.
METHODS DP CHECKING INFLATION. If a tendency to over-
exransion of business in one of the reserve districts occurs, the
tankers in that district are primarily responsible, ~nd their duty
lies in the necessity of carefully inspecting eve^y loan applica-
tion, and in some cases of raising the rate of loans. This may
lFinancial Age, December 20, 1913.
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be a case of discrimination, but that is a power of the banker,
and his conservative interest compels such discrimination. If
the banks in the district become careless or use poor judgment,
the Federal reserve bank of that district must take a hand. It
is admitted that the officials and directors are careful and ex-
perienced bankers, and through their discretion and advise will
be able to forestall any such overexpansion. As a last resort,
the rates of rediscount can be raised, and the commercial paper
which is offered can be very carefully scrutinized.
Then the Federal Reserve Board? ever standing watch over
the banks, will apply its authority and watch carefully the devel-
opments in this district. If there is over-expansion, it can use
its authority to reject applications for notes, raise the rate
of i .terest that must be paid by the reserve bank that receives
them, and insist upon a higher rate of discount to be charged
the member banks within that district. The board can remove the
officials in case of gross negligence or can call for special
reports and examinations, if ourside help is needed, it may be
obtained from the reserve banks by permitting them to rediscount
for the one which is in distress.
2
Again allow me to quote Professor Y/eston. "If the Federal
Reserve Board is conservative, and has the foresight to check a
too great expansion In business, there is little chance for expan-
sion and inflation. If loans are made easy and over-expansion is
not checked by means of its power, there is a real probability
of inflation. It is up to the board. "1 Thus, again, we see the
g
Conway and Patterson, Operation of the New Bank Act.
-'-Professor N. A. Weston, Lecture on the New Bank Act.
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power which the board alone holds in its hands.
Now let us for a moment consider the effect which the
new law will have upon the state banks and trust companies which
have developed to so large an extent in this country in the past
few years.
In the past, the national banks have possessed some
advantages over the state banks. National banks have had pre-
ference over the state banks in their right to note issue.
They have had the help of the Federal government and the
United States Treasury. They have been the depositories of the
surplus government funds, and they have been fostered by the
uniform banking law. But while the national banks have been
the depositories for the government, the payment of interest
on such deposits and the necessity of purchasing government
bonds has in a measure offset the advantage.
One great advantage that the state bank has had over the
national banks is its liberty of loaning on real estate. But
taking it all in all the state banks have been sidetracked for
the national ones.
With the new law, the name "Federal Reserve Bank" gives
the national institutions a distinct advantage. It carries
a great weight with people to feel that the government is behind
the national banks, and there are a great many people who are
attracted by the considerable amount of sentiment which
attends the name "national bank."
Very noticeable tardiness and reluctance has been shown
by the state institutions in entering the new system.
The
advantage of their entrance to the banks themselves are
many.
Thnr» , t.-M. rvix oer cent, return in
stock, but this
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is in a great measure dependent on the success of the system
and the reserve banks. There is the additional prestige
that will come from Federal supervision, with the strict exam-
inations that arc conducted by the Federal officials, and
the rigid reports that must be made in response to the calls
of the comotrolier. No matter what the disadvantages, this
1
advantage will doubtless be of value in attracting business.
Without a doubt, the greatest advantage to entering the
system is that of rediscount. The section in the L*w provides
that the banks in the system wi lldi scount only that paper
offered by member banks. If the banks can come to believe in
the advantage of rediscount, they will have at hand. a means
of securing prompt action in time of need, ana through
their membership will have access to the concentrated reserves
of the whole United States. Each bank will be able to
help its member banks and, by red i scount ing its paper, the
transfer of money and credit from one reserve bank to another
will be easy. Quite in contrast are the state banks, which are
in reality individuals; when panic occurs, or stringency exists,
these banks are unable to get outside help. This advantage
is without doubt the greatest of all, and it is the very thing
that the banks, in fact all the banks need, in the better
administration of their duty to themselves, to their
depositors, and to the community.
On the other hand there are disadvantages to the entrance
of state banks into the system. To some institutions, the
1. Conway & Patterson - Operation of the New Bank Act.
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requirement that the capital of the state banks that enter
must be equal to a amount for national banks in cities of the
same population will be a distinct hardship. The small
capital which some states allow a bank to start with is in a
measure offset by t e fact that a large amount of the deposits
are time deposits, and the new law requires only a five per
1
cent, reserve against them. The rigid and strict examinations
perhaps will hurt these state banks some, but in the case of the
Hew York S^ate Banks, their examinations have always been even
more close and riged than those of the national institutions.
The condition of loans may also prove a disadvantage
to the state bank. In some cases they are permitted to lend
to an individual as much as even fifty per cent, of its
ca. ital , while the new law will not allow to one person or
individual a loan of over ten per cent, of the capital.
And again some state banks will have but little paper wMch
they can discount at the reserve toanks.
Probably the most important factor influencing the action
of the state banks will center about the possibility of collect-
ing checks and drafts at par. The banker who will not have
the opportunity of clearing with the clearing house will be
at a great disadvantage. They will be very forcible if the
Reserve Board requires that the Federal reserve bank shall
act as clearing house for the banks in its district.
1. Conway & Patterson - Operation of the Hew Bank Act.
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The following is the statement issued by the National
Association of State Bank Supervisors in a meeting held at
Chicago January 19, 1914:
"Realizing that our country was in need of currency
reform, wc recognize the Federal Act as a distinctive st*p
forward in currency reform; Therefore,
"Be it Resolved, That we will co-operate with the Fed-
eral Reserve Bank in its efforts to obtain the best possible
results from the operation of said bill;
"Resolved, Further, That in order to maintain the fin-
ancial standing of our country and to meet certain needs in
different parts of the nation, we are of the opinion that there
is a large field of usefulness for banks in both stats
1
and national systems."
The following is an extract from a letter to state bank
correspondents of the Bank of Buffalo, N.Y.J signed by
President Elliott C. LlcDougal:
"We cannot see a single advantage to be gained by a
state bank which enters the Federal reserve system, and we see
a number of distinct disadvantages in addition to the ones
already mentioned in this circular, such as the certainty that
dividends in the stock investment cannot exceed six per cent,,
the uncertainty as to what that will be, the addition of another
set of examinations which we now have each examination to the
four year, the possible conflict between the regulations of our
State Banking Department and of the Federal Reserve Board which
1. Financial Age - January <ZA t 1914.
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night place a state bank in a very embarrassing position, and
others
.
"We hope that every State banker will take the time to
read over the entire bill, and th«*t each will cio his own think-
ing, and make up his own mind as to the merits and demerits
of the bill as applied to his own bank."
The following is an extract setting forth the advantages
and disadvantages of the system on the state banks of Michigan:
"Outdi.de the questions of advertising and the low reserve
requirements under the new currency act, the benefit of the act
will be more pronounced only during the periods of tight money,
or what may be termed money panics; and it is hard to conceive
how these can occur in any ordinary times with the currency
lav/ in force.
,
"It is also time that many of the smaller state banks
in Michigan will be more or less reluctant to come under the
terms of the currency law on accoutn of additional expenses,
of extra examinations and the added annoyance, and the v/ork
of sending two sets of reports, one to the Comptroller of the
Currency, as provided for in national banks, and another to the
State Department.
"Another objection to coming under the law is the fact
that after once becming stockholders, there is no avenue by
which they can surrender their membership or sell their
stock, unless they are forced to do so by the Federal Reserve
Board on account of non-compliance with their requirements.
1. Financial Age - January 24, 1914.
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"It is true that under section 85 of the currency law
<x state bank cannot act as a depository for Postal Savings
unless it becomes a member bank."
These letters and opinions in a measure show us how
some of the state bankers feel toward coming into the new
system. After the plan is perfected, there may be a decided
change in the attitude of those who are at present against
the entrance of their banks into the system.
U. Edward H. Doyle, Commissioner of Banking for MichI
gan - Financial Age, Jan. 31, 1914.
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Conclusion .
The panic of 1907, the causes for it and the results
which followed have been reviewed. We then discussed the remedy
needed for the prevention of a reoccurrence of such a condition
of affairs. "Te have followed the preparation and the passage
of the Act of May 50, 1908, and have drawn our conclusions
as to its merits and disadvantages. We have then seen the meas-
ure prepared by Chairman Kelson W. Aldrich of the National
Monetary Commission, and we have seen the disapproval the meas-
ure created in Congress.
We have stopped for a. moment to review the conditions of
our currency and banking, and to suggest need for the improve-
ment for those conditions. The last measure, known as the
New Bank Act, has then been presented and discussed as to its
merit s
.
These provisions represent the legislation along our
currency lines from the beginning of the year 1908 until the
New Bank Act passed in December, 1913,
In conclusion it may be said that our country seems
to be at present "on its feet" as far as banking and currency
questions are concerned, and if we continue to improve, there
is nothing to prohibit the United States from being the
greatest commercial and financial nation in the world.



